With the emergence in 2012 of the Malian crisis, which arose from the actions of so-called pro-independence and/or Salafist groups against the Malian state, the Community of West African States (ECOWAS) immediately proposed sending troops to southern Mali, while the Malian authorities wanted military support in the north, where the fighting was taking place. In doing so, the French soldiers of Operation Serval ultimately outstripped the ECOWAS troops.

On September 20, 2012 in Paris, the then Malian Prime Minister, Cheick Modibo Diarra, reported on the significant differences between ECOWAS, which wanted to deploy troops in the south of Mali, while the Malian authorities wanted its troops to be sent to the North, where the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) were waging war.

After an audience with Blaise Compaoré, then ECOWAS mediator in the conflict in Mali, Modibo Diarra highlighted the “discrepancies that exist between the proposals of the Economic Community of West African States and those of the Malian militar
y, in the intervention plans for northern Mali.”

Prime Minister Diarra made it clear that ECOWAS certainly has a plan, but that the Malian military also has a plan. “Of course, ECOWAS proposed a plan to end the crisis. This plan to end the crisis was discussed with the Malian military, who also had a plan to end the crisis that described in detail the type of aid they need,” he said. “Our soldiers have participated in ECOWAS efforts in the past. Today, it is Mali that has problems. ECOWAS must come to its aid. We must therefore register in this context and not in the wishes of who decides, who does what, he said.

Mr. Diarra also expressed the impatience of Malians and his government for an intervention that could help the country “put an end to the suffering of the people of the North as quickly as possible” while preserving as best as possible the lives of those who would be involved in a possible military intervention.

Political unrest, divisions within the army, but also faced with the increase in subve
rsive actions by armed groups and the difficulty of quickly finding points of convergence with ECOWAS, Mali turned to France, which immediately launched Operation Serval in January 2013.

In the end, ECOWAS was unable to deploy its standby force. The ECOWAS mission in Mali (MICEMA) that was in preparation fizzled out and was transformed into the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, placed under the responsibility of the African Union with the authorization of the UN.

France has been heavily involved in preparing the mission, promising to provide logistical support and train the African soldiers of AFISMA.

MISMA, through resolution 2085, gave itself a measured mission to contribute to “rebuilding the capacity of the Malian armed forces”. It was quickly replaced after a year of operationalization by MINUSMA, a UN mission. The French Barkhane mission supported by NATO member countries as well as the creation of the G5-Sahel will make ECOWAS be forgotten in the management of the crisis, except pro
bably for its mediator.

ECOWAS will return in force to Mali but this time to impose heavy sanctions on Malians, going as far as closing the land and air borders between ECOWAS countries and Mali, suspending all commercial and financial transactions between ECOWAS member states and Mali, with the exception of the following products: essential food products, pharmaceutical products, medical supplies and equipment, including Covid-19 control materials, petroleum products and electricity, or freezing the assets of the Republic of Mali in ECOWAS central banks.

These ECOWAS sanctions, unprecedented and rejected by the populations of the community area, were deemed unfair by the UEMOA Court of Justice, which ordered a stay of execution of the sanctions.

Source: Burkina Information Agency